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The Spin Doctor and the Nazis  
 
By Tim Luckhurst 
 
As the suspect approached the western side of Carlton House Terrace in 
Westminster on the afternoon of Wednesday 23rd November 1938, his MI5 tail 
noted that he wore a Homberg hat. He wDV ¶´ WDOO DQG RI PHGLXP EXLOG
Sporting a dark grey suit with narrow-cut trousers, he was blue eyed (with a slight 
squint in his right eye) and had dark hair and a fresh complexion. He wore a light 
grey tweed overcoat and walked with his feet turned out.  The Foreign Office was 
intrigued. This man was not one of their diplomats. So, who was the man in the 
homberg, why was he making visits to the German Embassy and who was his 
contact there?  
MI5 could answer all of these questions. They had a source inside the embassy 
as well as field agents to follow discreetly and observe meticulously. The security 
service had been watching the mystery man for some time. Nevertheless, their 
answers, supplied to Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary at the 
Foreign Office, on November 29th 1938 came as a shock. The suspect was George 
Steward, the Prime MinLVWHU¶VSHUVRQDOSUHVVRIILFHUDQGDFROOHDJXHVRGHGLFDWHG
to Neville Chamberlain that Cadogan feared Steward might be conducting private 
negotiations with WKH1D]LUHJLPHRQKLVERVV¶VEHKDOI  
Now, detail made available in secret intelligence files released to the national 
archives, adds much to our understanding of this most controversial episode in 
the history of relations between the British Press and Neville Chamberlain. 
Steward spent the hours between 1.15pm and 3.50 pm on Wednesday 23rd 
November 1938 in discussion with Dr Fritz Hesse, Press Attaché at the German 
Embassy. MI5 had learned of the meeting in advance when their source in the 
(PEDVV\WROGWKHPµ+HVVHZDVWRVHHDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH30¶7KHLULQLWLDO
UHDFWLRQZDVWRKDYH+HVVHZDWFKHGFORVHO\µWRVHHZKHWKHUWKHLULQIRUPDQWZDV
lying or QRW¶3ODLQO\WKHLQIRUPDQWZDVUHOLDEOHHe or she also supplied the text 
of a report +HVVHVHQW WR+LWOHU¶V)RUHLJQ6HFUHWDU\Joachim Von Ribbentrop, 
summarising his discussions with Steward.  
Dr Hesse believed Steward had offered a dramatic improvement in Anglo-
German relations that would greatly please the Nazi elite in Berlin. His report 
UHYHDOVWKDWWKHPDQ+HVVHUHIHUUHGWRDVµP\FRQWDFWZLWKWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶
RIIHUHGFRQFHVVLRQVZKLFK+HVVHWROG5LEEHQWURSµZRXOGKDYHLPPHGLDWHO\WKH
greatest effect on public opinion in England and would serve as the basis for a 
general Anglo-*HUPDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶+HVVHEHOLHYHGWKHJURXQGVQRZH[LVWHG
WRDFKLHYHµWKHKDSSLHVWDQGPRVWIDU-reaching effects for the relationship between 
WKHWZRFRXQWULHV¶ He FRQFOXGHGWKDWµ*UHDW%ULWDLQLVUHDG\GXULQJWKHQH[W
\HDUWRDFFHSWSUDFWLFDOO\HYHU\WKLQJIURPXVDQGWRIXOILORXUHYHU\ZLVK¶  
6WHZDUG¶VVHFUHWYLVLW to the Embassy was not his first. MI5 had been following 
him for a while. But the meeting during which he was identified took place in 
November 1938, just weeks after Chamberlain signed the Munich Pact handing 
most of Czechoslovakia over to German aggression. +LV SUHVV RIILFHU¶V
astonishing attempts to advance not just peace, but active partnership in 
international affairs between Britain and the Nazi regime, came at the high point 
of appeasement. In March 1939 Hitler would demonstrated the worthlessness of 
the Munich agreement by seizing the last remaining portion of Czechoslovakian 
territory. Until then Steward, like his boss, was riding high. Indeed, his secret 
meeting with the Nazi diplomat may have tasted additionally sweet because it 
came in the immediate aftermath of victory over his most dangerous rival.  
Rex Leeper of the Foreign Office News Department was determined to obstruct 
appeasement. Chamberlain considered him rebellious and disloyal. And the 
Prime Minister had reason to distrust this Australian-born graduate of Melbourne 
Grammar School and New College Oxford. Determined to counter the pro-
appeasement briefings that poured from Downing Street into the ears of 
newspaper proprietors, editors and correspondents, Leeper had set up his own 
rebuttal operation. Until ChambeUODLQ¶VVKRUW-lived triumph at Munich gave him 
the authority to close down the Foreign Office as a bastion of opposition to 
appeasement, Leeper had run a slick operation. It was designed to beat the one 
run RQ&KDPEHUODLQ¶VEHKDOI by George Steward and Sir Joseph Ball, Chairman 
of the Conservative Research Department. Each of these men was determined to 
cajole newspapers into accepting and promoting their political priorities.  
Newspapers mattered in the late 1930s. Nearly 80% of households took one of 
the popular national dailies, the Daily Express, Daily Mirror, Daily Mail, News 
Chronicle, Daily Sketch or Daily Herald. Middle class families would often buy 
a quality broadsheet such as the Times, Daily Telegraph, Scotsman or Yorkshire 
Post as well. And, in his relationship with these powerful and ferociously 
opinionated titles, Neville Chamberlain was a thoroughly modern politician. He 
hated journalists, but he recognised the power of mass circulation newspapers and 
yearned to control them. In his excellent, Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, 
Appeasement and the Manipulation of the Press,  Richard Cockett has described 
how, between 1937 and 1940, the high priest of appeasement curbed the hostility 
of British newspapers towards Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and converted 
most of them to active support.  
Chamberlain himself maintained a friendship with Lord Kemsley, owner of the 
Sunday Times and Daily Sketch. He was also close to Geoffrey Dawson, Editor 
of The Times and a zealous appeaser. Among my favourite photographs of the era 
is one depicting Dawson deep in in conversation with Chamberlain on the tarmac 
at Heston airport in West London as the Prime Minister prepared to board his 
flight to Munich. Lord Astor of the Observer, needed no persuasion. He and his 
wife, the society hostess Nancy Astor, regarded Chamberlain as a prophet.  
Steward and Ball helped him with these newspapers and with the mass market 
Daily Mail, Daily Express, News Chronicle and Daily Telegraph.  James 
Margach, lobby correspondent of The Times, REVHUYHG DFLGO\ WKDW µIURP WKH
moment he [Chamberlain] entered Number 10 in 1937 he sought to manipulate 
WKH3UHVVLQWRVXSSRUWLQJKLVSROLF\RIDSSHDVLQJWKHGLFWDWRUV¶ 
Much of his VXFFHVVZDVGXHWR*HRUJH6WHZDUG¶V brilliant manipulation of the 
parliamentary lobby. As a group of senior political journalists with privileged 
access to Westminster and Whitehall, the lobby had existed since 1855.  Steward 
set out to use it in a new way. The old tradition whereby respected members of 
the lobby could talk freely to MPs, ministers and civil servants appalled him. By 
using such contacts a good reporter might find and report a range of competing 
opinions. Steward aspired to present appeasement as the settled will of a united 
cabinet and the ideal way to secure British interests.  
To achieve his ends, George Steward concluded that all significant information 
about government policy must reach lobby correspondents through his lips or 
those of a loyal minister. And, by making regular, scheduled lobby briefings the 
key source of news, he tamed many of the most powerful correspondents. If they 
listened and reported what he told them without attribution ± as lobby rules 
required ± they would remain privileged insiders. That their readers would be 
conned into imagining these ostensibly factual insights into Government thinking 
were unchallenged truth was, of course, the whole point. And Steward was good 
at it. By the time Chamberlain most needed support from political journalists, 
Steward¶V remodelled lobby worked so well that loyal ministers were often happy 
to brief the correspondents themselves.  They knew their words would be 
presented as authoritative and that the rules on attribution meant they could not 
be held accountable for what they said.    
What really got under 6WHZDUG¶Vskin was that Rex Leeper, the upstart colonial at 
the Foreign Office, was almost equally adept. Leeper had gathered around him a 
loyal coterie of diplomatic correspondents to whom he offered a bespoke service 
on lobby terms: lots of insider information but no-attribution. Among those who 
listened attentively were F.A. Voigt of the Manchester Guardian Vernon Bartlett 
of the News Chronicle Victor Gordon-Lennox of the Daily Telegraph, Norman 
Ewer of the Daily Herald and Charles Tower of the Yorkshire Post. 
Leeper showed these correspondents secret diplomatic cables and analyses 
carefully selected to make the case against appeasement as emphatically as 
possible. In this respect, Leeper was no less selective than Steward. He would 
show his correspondents truly sensitive material, but only if it would help the 
cause. 2QH YHWHUDQ FRUUHVSRQGHQW FDOOHG WKHVH MRXUQDOLVWV µ/HHSHU¶V SHWV¶%XW
they were not quite as PHHNO\ REHGLHQW DV 6WHZDUG¶V GLVFLSOHV :KHQ WKHLU
newspapers declined to publish stories that went too blatantly against the line as 
SUHDFKHGE\'RZQLQJ6WUHHWVHYHUDORI/HHSHU¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQWVRIIHUHGWKHPWR
the private, anti-appeasement newsletters then circulating. These alternative 
outlets, such as &ODXGH &RFNEXUQ¶V The Week, achieved real influence among 
opinion formers precisely because they were prepared to challenge the stifling 
orthodoxy about appeasement promoted so avidly by George Steward.   
And Rex Leeper did not toil alone. Until the end of 1937 he was supported by Sir 
Robert Vansittart, &DGRJDQ¶VSUHGHFHVVRUDV Permanent Under Secretary at the 
Foreign Office and a passionate opponent of appeasement. Vansittart ran an 
intelligence operation to obtain news about the activities of the Nazi regime in 
Germany. He used material his agents supplied on German rearmament and the 
growth of concentration camps to brief like-minded MPs including Winston 
Churchill. Vansittart encouraged Leeper to take similar risks.          
By thHWLPHRI6WHZDUG¶VFODndestine meeting with Hesse, both Rex Leeper and 
Sir Robert Vansittart had been forced out of their frontline jobs at the Prime 
0LQLVWHU¶VLQVLVWHnce. But a draft of the report Hesse wrote to Ribbentrop after 
their long meeting on November 23rd 1938 contains powerful evidence that 
*HRUJH6WHZDUGVWLOOGLGQRWWUXVWWKH)RUHLJQ2IILFHWRVXSSRUW&KDPEHUODLQ¶V
policy. Nor was he prepared to forgive his erstwhile enemies. Steward told his 
Nazi friend that their proposed Anglo-German agreement µVKRXld not be 
negotiated through ordinary diplomatic channels, but settled direct between the 
Fuhrer and Chamberlain, in which case complete secrecy on the English side 
FRXOG EH UHFNRQHG ZLWK XQWLO LWV FRPSOHWLRQ¶ Clearly, Steward remained 
determined to cut the Foreign Office out of any deal. He imagined that Anglo-
German amity would EXUQLVKKLVEHORYHG&KDPEHUODLQ¶VUHSXWDWLRQDV the hero 
of the age.    
Secret intelligence documents, culled from the key point of liaison between the 
)RUHLJQ2IILFHDQG%ULWDLQ¶s intelligence services, show that Steward also offered 
the Nazi diplomat a chilling vision of future cross-party and newspaper support. 
+HVVHZURWHWKDW6WHZDUGWROGKLPµKHZRXOGYRXFKWKDWVXFKDGHFODUDWLRQZRXOG
also be used by the Labour Party to make a fundamental declaration of friendship 
to Germany and also that the English Press would fundamentally change its 
DWWLWXGH¶ Hitler was disproportionately sensitive about anti-Nazi opinion in 
British newspapers. He imagined it expressed government policy.   
Dr Fritz Hesse was a Nazi diplomat anxious to impress his masters and to advance 
his career. But there is no reason to doubt that George Steward made the offers 
he described. Steward worked zealously to advance the cause of appeasement 
throughout &KDPEHUODLQ¶VSUHPLHUVKLS and saw all who challenged his master as 
enemies of the national interest. The battle he fought against Rex Leeper was as 
rancorous and as personal as any fought between Alastair Campbell and Gordon 
%URZQ¶VVSLQGRFWRU'DPLDQ0F%Uide. George Steward was the first person to 
do a job comparable to the one modern spin doctors such as Joe Haines, Alastair 
Campbell and Bernard Ingham would fill. And he exercised similar power at a 
uniquely sensitive historical moment. We know how highly Chamberlain valued 
his services. 
In the recently released documents, a treasure trove of communications between 
WKH)RUHLJQ2IILFHDQG%ULWDLQ¶VLQWHOOLJHQFHVHUYLFHVLVDVHOI-typed document 
SUHSDUHG E\ 6LU $OH[DQGHU &DGRJDQ 9DQVLWWDUW¶V UHSODFHPHQW DW WKH )RUHLJQ
Office. In it, Cadogan debates the pros and cons of confronting the Prime Minister 
ZLWK0,¶VHYLGHQFHDERXW*HRUJH6WHZDUG¶VFODQGHVWLQHPHHWLQJVZLWK+HVVH
Cadogan worried WKDW &KDPEHUODLQ µ:RXOG SUREDEO\ WKLQN WKDW KLV SROLF\ RI
appeasement had been torpedoed by the wicked anti-*HUPDQ)RUHLJQ2IILFH¶
Nevertheless, the new Permanent Undersecretary concluded that Chamberlain 
must be told. ,IWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVSURSRVHGE\6WHZDUGZHUHWRSURFHHGµWKH\FDQ
only result in discomfiting the moderates in Germany, in confirming the 
extremists in power, and in some bogus settlement which will be the beginning 
of the end of the British Empire, chloroformed as it will be by a totally false 
impression of security¶. 
Briefed by Cadogan, Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, confronted 
&KDPEHUODLQZLWK0,¶VUHSRUW&KDPEHUODLQPDQDJHGWRDSSHDUµDJKDVWDWWKH
QHZV¶  but his subsequent conduct did nothing to suggest that the Prime minister 
GLVDSSURYHGRIKLVSUHVVRIILFHU¶VDFWLYLWLHV or disowned his approach. George 
Steward¶V MRE ZDV VHFXUH. He UHPDLQHG DW 1HYLOOH &KDPEHUODLQ¶V VLGH until 
Winston Churchill took office in May 1940.       
 
Tim Luckhurst is Professor of Journalism at the University of Kent.  
7KH ILOHV UHIHUUHG WRDUH IURP WKH3HUPDQHQW8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶V'HSDUWPHQWDQ
important point of liaison between the Foreign Office and the Intelligence 
services. They may be accessed via http://www.secretintelligencefiles.com/The-
Collection/Overview or in The National Archives.  
        
 
 
  
